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Abstract
In this paper, we use an inductive approach and longitudinal analysis to explore political influences on the emergence and
evolution of climate change adaptation policy and planning at national level, as well as the institutions within which it is
embedded, for three countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia). Data collection involved quantitative
and qualitative methods applied over a 6-year period from 2012 to 2017. This included a survey of 103 government staff (20 in
Malawi, 29 in Tanzania and 54 in Zambia) and 242 interviews (106 in Malawi, 86 in Tanzania and 50 in Zambia) with a wide
range of stakeholders, many of whom were interviewed multiple times over the study period, together with content analysis of
relevant policy and programme documents. Whilst the climate adaptation agenda emerged in all three countries around 2007–
2009, associated with multilateral funding initiatives, the rate and nature of progress has varied—until roughly 2015 when, for
different reasons, momentum slowed. We find differences between the countries in terms of specifics of how they operated, but
roles of two factors in common emerge in the evolution of the climate change adaptation agendas: national leadership and allied
political priorities, and the role of additional funding provided by donors. These influences lead to changes in the policy and
institutional frameworks for addressing climate change, as well as in the emphasis placed on climate change adaptation. By
examining the different ways through which ideas, power and resources converge and by learning from the specific configura-
tions in the country examples, we identify opportunities to address existing barriers to action and thus present implications that
enable more effective adaptation planning in other countries. We show that more socially just and inclusive national climate
adaptation planning requires a critical approach to understanding these configurations of power and politics.
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Introduction
Addressing climate change requires appropriate plans and in-
stitutions to be put in place. The rapid development of climate
change adaptation policies and plans globally is an encourag-
ing trend (Nachmany et al. 2017) and has been supported by
international policy frameworks of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and
the Sustainable Development Goals, among others. A policy
implementation gap with respect to climate change has re-
ceived considerable attention (Biesbroek et al. 2013; Dupuis
and Knoepfel 2013; Næss et al. 2015; Uittenbroek 2016), with
the influence of politics often noted (e.g. Funder and
Mweemba 2019; England et al. 2018a). Less focus has, how-
ever, been applied to the ways in which various politics—in
terms of negotiation and contestation of power by state and
non-state actors—affect the formation, evolution and agree-
ment of policies upstream, including the institutional and gov-
ernance structures in which they are embedded (Eriksen et al.
2015).
Differing political contexts mean that countries that expe-
rience similar climate change challenges might follow differ-
ent pathways in the emergence and evolution of an agenda.
We find this to be the case for Malawi, Tanzania and
Zambia—neighbouring countries in the SADC region in
sub-Saharan Africa ranked 156, 149 and 142, respectively
(out of 181 countries), in ND-GAIN’s Global Adaptation
Index—that combines vulnerability with readiness to respond
to climate change (https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-
index/). All three countries have experienced recent
damaging major flood and drought events, and whilst there
remains high uncertainty about changes in mean rainfall,
variability is projected to increase, with higher frequency
and intensity of extremes (Mittal et al. 2017; Conway et al.
2017; Davis-Reddy and Vincent 2017). Each country has
frameworks in place to respond to climate change, but these
differ in nature and scope reflecting each country’s political
economy, which determines priorities and the allocation of
resources. As governments change and new presidents as-
sume power, the priority placed on climate change can shift,
as well as the commitment to policies, programmes and an
enabling institutional framework. The role of external influ-
ences, such as donors, is also key given the limited availability
of domestic resources.
Drawing on multiple and often repeat in-depth interviews,
a survey of government staff and content analysis of policy
and programme documents, we take a longitudinal and induc-
tive approach to surface the political factors that are associated
with the emergence and evolution of climate adaptation
policies—and the governance and institutional structures in
which they are embedded—over approximately the last de-
cade. “Political factors and their role in climate change adap-
tation in sub-Saharan Africa” provides a review of existing
literature on the political economy of adaptation planning,
and “Methodology” presents the methods applied in this
study. “The emergence and evolution of national
climate adaptation policy” gives an overview and historical
contextualisation of the emergence and evolution of the cli-
mate change agenda in each country, covering policies,
programmes and institutional context for addressing adapta-
tion. Building on this, “Key political factors affecting the
emergence and evolution of the national climate adaptation
agenda in the three countries” then analyses two key elements
of politics and power that emerge as important to the evolution
of climate change agendas in the countries. “Discussion and
conclusion” discusses the implications of these findings for
adaptation planning and action in sub-Saharan Africa and
concludes by arguing for the importance of analysing the up-
stream role of political factors in formal climate adaptation
agendas to understand the drivers behind policy (in)action.
Political factors and their role in climate
change adaptation in sub-Saharan Africa
Climate change policy does not arise in a political vacuum. It
has to be integrated with existing political and organisational
contexts, including within their “organisational routines”
(Uittenbroek 2016). This does not happen independent of
the operation of power, showing that climate change is a po-
litical issue (Nightingale 2017). Political economy, defined as
“the processes by which ideas, power and resources are
conceptualised, negotiated and implemented by different
groups and different scales”, offers useful insights into the
forces that shape climate policy (Tanner and Allouche
2011:1). Such an approach immediately places climate policy
in the context of “long standing debates and struggles over
resources between actors and institutions” (Næss et al. 2015:
543). It thus follows that an understanding of the underlying
political and economic processes and their embedded histories
helps to reveal causal mechanisms that may also shed light on
entry points and opportunities for change (Næss et al. 2015;
Sovacool et al. 2015).
Political economy studies of climate change have focused
on the construction of narratives around climate change causes
and consequences (Levy and Spicer 2013) and how these are
then variously applied, for example, through the media
(Boykoff and Yulsman 2013). Political economymarks a shift
from an economic focus on material factors to one where the
role of ideas and ideology in determining policy outcomes is
recognised, through the application of power and resources
(Tanner and Allouche 2011). In so doing, it acknowledges a
role for bargaining between different actors (e.g. state and
non-state) (Paterson and P-Laberge, 2018). In terms of out-
comes, political economy analysis can also shed light on the
shaping and allocation of risk and opportunity (Gotham 2016;
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Nightingale 2017; Mallin 2018). It provides insights into how
and why trade-offs are made between competing goals,
denoting which issues and groups emerge as winners or losers
(Sovacool et al. 2015; Sovacool and Linnér 2015; Sovacool
et al. 2017).
The hierarchical nature of implementing ministries in
Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia means that the highest levels
of leadership, particularly the presidential level, are most in-
fluential on policy prioritisation (Pardoe et al. 2018a). Where
institutional (and political) contexts allow, policy champions
may also emerge at the ministry level to advance policy
agendas. Such a process is, however, largely dependent on
capacities of champions to exert their agency through a con-
fluence of individual decision-making power and resource
allocation privileges, both of which can be constrained by
the wider political landscape (Funder et al. 2018; Habtezion
et al. 2015) and organisational cultures and practices (Pardoe
et al. 2018a).
The role of external influences has been a prominent fea-
ture of political economy analysis due to the framework pro-
vided by international policy processes (including negotia-
tions and the promise of climate financing) on national climate
change policy development and the different demands on de-
veloped and developing countries (Funder et al. 2018). A need
to explore the changing nature of ideologies, power and re-
sources under external (donor) influences at the national level
has been noted, as they may exert important influences
(Lockwood 2013; Næss et al. 2011; Tanner and Allouche
2011). Funder et al. (2018) and Pardoe et al. (2018a) found
that donors may act as a positive force in providing additional
resources to supplement domestic budgets, but that such sup-
port can divert and stretch staff resources, as donor recipients
are required to fulfil reporting requirements and allocate staff
as local contact points and facilitators.
Acknowledging the limited capacities of low-income coun-
tries and reflecting historical disadvantages, international fi-
nancing has long been enshrined within the UNFCCC to sup-
port adaptation planning and is also explicit in the Paris
Agreement (Bouwer and Aerts 2006; Biagini et al. 2014;
Kinley 2017). Whether and how such funding effectively sup-
ports the design and implementation of adaptation policy and
programmes partly depends on political economy in the re-
ceiving countries and the way in which ideas, power and re-
sources are utilised (Tanner and Allouche 2011). This is also
the case for international development assistance (Barnett
2008), much of which now mainstreams climate change in
order to support adaptation (e.g. Klein et al. 2007; Ayers and
Huq 2009). A growing body of literature is, however, critiqu-
ing the ways in which the exercise of power is reflected in
adaptation financing, highlighting imbalances and inequity in
targeting (Sovacool et al. 2017) and its role in the politics of
vulnerability and adaptation among intended beneficiaries
(Mikulewicz 2020). In particular, questions have already been
raised regarding the potential inequitable application of adap-
tation finance (Barrett 2014; Persson and Remling 2014;
Remling and Persson 2015).
Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia are, or have been, major
overseas development assistance recipient countries, and in all
three, the modalities of climate change funding (and much of
the focus of our field work) are largely through pre-existing aid
architecture and actors, particularly through bi- and multilateral
processes. It is, thus, critical to consider attempts at policy in-
fluence and finance disbursement for adaptation in the context
of wider debates on aid effectiveness and African states which
have been the focus of several decades of attempts to incorpo-
rate or strengthen political/political economy analysis (Clark
et al. 2005; Booth 2012; Yanguas and Hulme 2015).
To date, most political economy studies of climate change
in developing countries have concentrated on in-depth studies
of particular situations and countries. For example, Funder
et al. (2018) examined resource control and state
intervention in Zambia; Dodman and Mitlin (2015) looked
at national to subnational processes in Zimbabwe; Tschakert
et al. (2016) showed how micropolitics affects local level
flood planning in India; and Nightingale (2017) showed how
adaptation forms an arena in which multiple actors bargain for
and contest power in Nepal. Research on the role of donors
and external agents as actors in the process of adaptation pol-
icy design upstream is also a gap and one that is critically
important to address in low-income country contexts.
We aim here to inductively research the sources and rela-
tive roles of internal and external power in the construction of
the climate adaptation agendas in three sub-Saharan African
countries—Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia-from its emer-
gence in roughly 2007–2009. These southern African coun-
tries confront similar climate change risk, have experienced
recent leadership change through presidential elections, and
are all major recipients of donor assistance. By examining the
emergence and evolution of climate adaptation policy over
approximately the last decade, and the governance and insti-
tutional structures in which it is embedded, we identify the
particular roles of two factors: national leadership and the role
of international donors. This contributes to the political econ-
omy literature in two ways: firstly, by providing upstream
analysis, compared with a focus on distributional outcomes
(“winners” and “losers”) and implementation effectiveness,
which of course are affected by the upstream situation; and
secondly, by surfacing two political factors that are common
across several countries—although the ways in which they
manifest differ according to the context.
Methodology
The three case studies were selected as examples of low-
income countries in sub-Saharan Africa where the research
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team had long-standing interactions related to adaptation re-
search and practice, with each country facing similar climate
change challenges that play out in different ways through their
different political economies. Our theoretical starting point is
recent literature on the importance of political economy fac-
tors as they relate to adaptation (e.g. Barnett 2008; Eriksen
et al. 2015) and the need to bring further empirical data to this
growing area of scholarship. Our specific aim is to elicit po-
litical factors affecting the emergence and evolution of nation-
al adaptation policy and the governance and institutional
structures in which it is embedded. Our research design is
inductive and exploratory (as often done in qualitative social
science, e.g. Gisselquist 2014). Whilst the approach is similar
to process tracing, which uses diagnostic evidence to provide
the basis for both descriptive and causal inference and con-
siders the unfolding of events over time (Collier 2011), it is
not based on specific prior hypotheses or a formal analytical
framework. As such, we do not include all the steps recom-
mended in a checklist for process tracing, e.g. by Ricks and
Liu (2018), rather we adopt an “ethnographic sensibility” that
recognises the strengths of qualitative research in eliciting
contextualised understandings of political processes
(Simmons and Smith, 2017). Given this approach, our insights
are associative not causal, and there is no claim to representa-
tiveness beyond the three cases—the inability to control for
many confounding factors in local context precludes us from
making any causal inference. Note that, whilst climate change
adaptation and disaster risk reduction show many comple-
mentarities and synergies, the fact that they are addressed by
different policy and institutional frameworks means that we
focus on the climate adaptation architecture here.
The case studies are presented with insights gained through
an inductive process of multiple and often repeat in-depth
semi-structured interviews with representatives from a variety
of actors engaged in climate change, including ministries and
government bodies (covering agriculture, water, energy, nat-
ural resources, environment, disaster risk management, etc.),
multilateral and bilateral donors, civil society, private sector
and academics and a once-off survey administered to govern-
ment staff in implementing ministries. The samples for inter-
views and the survey involved purposive snowballing based
on stakeholder analysis of the adaptation landscape in each
country and further recommendations by interviewees. The
survey enabled collection of quantitative data and simple
open-ended questions, whilst semi-structured interviews
allowed emergence and exploration of issues deemed impor-
tant to the interviewees (Patton 1980). Policy analysis was
also conducted over a 6-year period on relevant climate
change policies, strategies and programmes (see England
et al. 2018b) obtained through government sources and
cross-referenced by interviewees.
In total, 242 interviews were conducted over a 6-year pe-
riod, on multiple occasions between 2012 and 2017 (n = 106
inMalawi, n = 86 in Tanzania and n = 50 in Zambia) (Table 1)
(see also Vincent et al. 2015; Nachmany 2018; Pardoe et al.
2018a, b; England et al. 2018b). Since the interviews were
conducted over a long time period, it was possible for repeat
interviews to take place, with some respondents being
interviewed up to five times and a small proportion that had
changed ministry. Interviews therefore allowed an examina-
tion of the evolution of the politics of climate change over
time, reflecting the emergence of the national policy agenda
around 2009 in all three countries, as well as perspectives on
different sectoral viewpoints, rather than simply a snapshot.
The interviews were structured broadly around issues relating
to the national climate change agenda, with themes investigat-
ing: the processes through which climate policy has been de-
veloped and reasons for progress or stalling; the ways in
which various interests have manifested; how ministries, do-
nors and other groups work together or otherwise; how cli-
mate change is viewed and prioritised and the challenges for
climate policy implementation.
The survey was administered to staff working at the
national and local (district) levels of government, across
a range of departments responsible for planning and
implementing climate change adaptation strategies. The
survey complemented the interviews with a focus on the
institutional context of key implementing ministries,
considering the workplace environment and capacities
relating to adaptation. In total, 103 surveys were com-
pleted by respondents (n = 20 in Malawi, n = 29 in
Tanzania, n = 54 in Zambia) from 2016 to 2017, with
representation of all the sectors outlined in Table 1 (al-
though often interviewees and survey respondents were
different, with interviewees typically comprising higher
level positions, e.g. directors and deputy directors,
whilst the survey was targeted to technical staff).
Following our purposeful snowball sampling, we had
the opportunity to administer the survey at a workshop
in Zambia where a large number of the target govern-
ment staff were present, enabling us to obtain more
returns there. Since responses are anonymous, it is not
possible to determine the exact extent of overlap with
interviewees. Surveys were only distributed to govern-
ment staff; however, whereas a large proportion of in-
terviewees are based outside of government and based
on distribution of surveys, there is likely to be less than
10% overlap. The aims of the interviews and surveys
were complementary rather than overlapping, so partic-
ipation of a small number of individuals in both
methods does not compromise the validity of findings.
Quantitative survey findings were stored and analysed in
SPSS for simple descriptive statistics. The results of open-
ended questions in the survey and transcripts of semi-
structured interviews and the policy documents underwent a
process of iterative and inductive content analysis to develop
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coding themes. The results presented in “The emergence and
evolution of national climate adaptation policy” all arise from
our inductive analysis of the qualitative findings,
complemented with specific quotations and statistics of quanti-
tative results. The interviews and survey findings are supple-
mented by an analysis of the trends in climate change policy
development in each of the three countries. Dedicated climate
change policies that originate from the responsible ministry
were collected, analysed for content and placed on a timeline
to assess those points at which the drafting process began to
emerge and how this unfolded to the point of adoption, along
with the institutions mandated to lead on climate change issues.
The emergence and evolution
of national climate adaptation policy
In the three case studies, a range of institutional framings for
climate change has developed and evolved, helping to
contextualise and explain the present day situation. At the same
time, all three countries have experienced sometimes multiple
changes in political leadership since climate change began to be
integrated into national policy discussions from around 2009,
when the issue appeared on domestic agendas. Malawi,
Tanzania and Zambia all produced National Adaptation
Programmes of Action (NAPAs) prior to that, as mandated by
Table 1 Summary of interviewees by type and country
Malawi (n = 106) Tanzania (n = 86) Zambia (n = 50)
Government (note sectors
are summarised since the ministry
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the UNFCCC (Government of Malawi 2006; Government of
Zambia, 2007; URT 2007). Any change in government can
trigger sudden changes to policy priorities and shifts in the
political economy, which bring new ideas to the fore, pushing
others back or off the agenda and changing power relations and
consequently financial and human resource allocations. In this
section, we examine the evolution of climate change as a na-
tional policy issue, taking into account the adoption of policies,
strategies and programmes and the institutional and governance
landscape in which they are embedded. Tables 2, 3 and 4 out-
line timelines for Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia, respectively,
that show major political milestones, ministries, key policy
documents and programmes and other key events that have
affected national adaptation planning.
Malawi
In Malawi, the housing of the climate change agenda and the
political priorities accorded to it have changed over time
(Table 2). The development of the institutional and policy en-
vironment to support climate change was initially supported by
Malawi’s involvement in the JICA-funded Africa Adaptation
Programme (2008–2012) (Malawi NGO representative). The
programme undertook a number of studies to assess the most
appropriate institutional framework and capacity and policy
needs for climate change (Government of Malawi 2011a, b).
It was institutionalised through the National Climate Change
Programme (NCCP) and housed in the Department for
Economic Planning and Development in the Ministry of
Economic Planning and Development Cooperation. The
NCCP aimed to create a National Climate Change Response
Framework and Strategy to support national and local govern-
ment institutions in delivering long-term climate-resilient and
sustainable development. A National Steering Committee on
Climate Change, comprising Principal Secretaries, was set up,
supported by a National Technical Committee on Climate
Change represented by government, academia and non-
government technical staff (Malawi multilateral donor, govern-
ment and NGO representatives).
The impetus created by the NCCP was a key driver behind
the creation of a Ministry of Environment and Climate Change
Management by Joyce Banda, who assumed the Presidency in
2012. The NCCP thus shifted to the Environmental Affairs
Department within this ministry, which also acted as the focal
point for the UNFCCC. Another department within the same
ministry—the Department for Climate Change and
Meteorological Services—is the country’s nationalmeteorolog-
ical agency and the primary supplier of forecasts and climate
information.
In 2013, establishment of the Ministry of Environment and
Climate Change Management (MECCM) signalled high level
commitment to addressing climate change (Malawi multilateral
donor, government representatives). A National Climate Change
and Environment Communication Strategy 2012–16 was re-
leased (Government of Malawi 2012). A National Climate
Change Investment Plan 2013–18 was also developed and for-
mally endorsed in 2013 (Government of Malawi 2013). This
essentially proposes a Climate Change, Environment and
Natural Resources Management Sector Wide Approach to direct
donor funds for streamlined strategy implementation, with the
ultimate aim of establishing a Climate Change Fund to strength-
en channelling of both public and private climate finance.
Climate change was also recognised in national planning docu-
ments, such as theMalawi Growth and Development Strategy II,
2011–2016 (Government of Malawi 2011c).
From 2012 to 2014, the MECCM was able to continue the
momentum created by the NCCP and coordinated the drafting
of a National Climate ChangeManagement Policy, which was
Table 2 Evolution of the national climate change agenda in Malawi: policies, programmes, institutions and linkage to political leadership
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in advanced draft by the end of 2013. However, as soon as the
2014 presidential elections were called, the policy approval
process was put on hold, resulting in the policy ultimately
waiting until 2016 to be finally approved (Malawi multilateral
donor, government and NGO representatives).
The new President elected in 2014 made the decision to
restructure. The Environmental Affairs Department and
Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services
became part of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and
Mining. However, the senior management remained un-
changed, enabling momentum to be continued with the approv-
al of the policy in 2016 (Government of Malawi 2016).
Subsequently, the focus has been on policy implementation
and the development of a National Climate Change Strategy.
When the third iteration of the Malawi Growth and
Development Strategy 2017–22 was released, however, it did
not contain the same emphasis on climate change, instead in-
corporating it in one of the six key areas, named “agriculture,
water development and climate change management”
(Government of Malawi 2017).
Tanzania
In Tanzania, climate change is located under the Vice President’s
Office, within the Division of Environment (DoE). Since the
publication of the NAPA in 2007, climate change has been in-
creasingly mainstreamed into sectoral policies and plans (URT
2007; Pardoe et al. 2018b). Those dedicated national policies and
strategies on climate change from the Division of Environment
were, however, only published in 2012 (Table 3). These consist
of the National Climate Change Strategy (URT 2012a), the
National Climate Change Communication Strategy (URT
2012b) and Guidelines for Integrating Climate Change
Adaptation into National Sectoral Policies (URT 2012c). Since
2012, there have been no further climate change strategies or
plans published by the DoE, and critically, Tanzania still lacks
a dedicated climate change policy (Smucker et al. 2015).
However, a review and revision of the National Environment
Policy, published in 1997, was underway at the time of inter-
views in 2017 (Tanzania government agency representative).
The revised policy is expected to include references to climate
change and adaptation, which were not mentioned in the 1997
version (Maro 2008). It is unclear to what extent climate change
will feature in the policy, as compared with other environmental
concerns, due to considerable uncertainty over the national posi-
tion on climate change, since elections in 2015 (Tanzania NGO
representative).
Climate change has been located under the DoE since it was
first recognised at the national level—but the DoE is not
recognised as a particularly powerful department (Tanzania
NGO and donor representatives). Indeed, the DoE tends to avoid
a proactive approach to promote the integration of climate change
in sectoral policy and planning (Tanzania government agency
representative). Instead, sectors that have been more proactive
have tended to do so with donor support, based on a recognition
of the importance of the issue for the sector (Tanzania
government agency and donor representatives; URT 2018;
MAFC 2014). Addressing climate change at the department
Table 3 Evolution of the national climate change agenda in Tanzania: policies, programmes, institutions and linkage to political leadership
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Polical 
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and ministry level tends to be undertaken in a fairly ad hoc
manner, as opposed to forming part of a wider nationally coordi-
nated effort (Tanzania NGO and donor representatives).
Zambia
Climate change arose as a domestic political issue in Zambia in
2009, when UNDP, with the support of the government of
Norway, established a Climate Change Facilitation Unit
(CCFU) in the Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural
Resources (Zambia government representative)(Table 4). The
CCFU was staffed by government and external experts, whose
role included leadership of development of a National Climate
Change Communications and Advocacy Strategy and National
Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) and initial steps
in drafting a policy (Republic of Zambia 2011a, b). Following a
presidential election in 2011, twoministerial reshuffles in quick
succession saw the institutional home for the CCFU shift twice,
to ultimately reside in theMinistry of Lands, Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection (Zambia government and NGO
representatives).
As part of the policy development process, the NCCRS rec-
ommended establishment of a National Climate Change
Development Council. Structural arrangements to accommo-
date this were discussed by sectors considered vulnerable by
the NAPA and the NCCRS (Republic of Zambia 2007, 2011b).
Discussions were not resolved at the start of a large project-the
Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR), which re-
quired a secretariat to oversee its activities. Thus, with the
CCFU’s mandate essentially complete, it was subsumed in
2012-2013 into an Interim Climate Change Secretariat
(ICCS). The intention was that this would eventually form the
basis of the council which, in turn, would be responsible for
overseeing the implementation of the policy (Zambia govern-
ment and NGO representatives). Following some debate, the
council placed the ICCS under the Ministry of Finance.
The ICCS was mandated to coordinate climate change ac-
tivities across government, including programmes funded by
Table 4 Evolution of the national climate change agenda in Zambia: policies, programmes, institutions and linkage to political leadership
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Polical 
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external parties, and to act as the implementing secretariat for
the PPCR. The timing was serendipitous, as the PPCR con-
tributed to the administrative and fiduciary costs during the
setting-up and the running of the ICCS, enabling the momen-
tum achieved during CCFU to be maintained (Zambia gov-
ernment representative). From 2012 to 2017, ICCS success-
fully coordinated a number of major climate change projects
in country, funded by major multilateral and bilateral donors.
The establishment of ICCS added complexity to the insti-
tutional landscape of addressing climate change in Zambia,
since it brought on board an additional ministry (its parent
ministry, the Ministry of Finance). The Ministry of Lands,
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection retained
the function of focal point to both the IPCC and UNFCCC.
The interest of the Ministry of Finance in being involved in
climate change issues was cemented in August 2014, when it
was nominated to be the country’s National Designated
Authority to the Green Climate Fund.
Following the 2016 presidential election, an additional cab-
inet reshuffle added further complications, when both minis-
tries involved in climate change were split. The Ministry of
Finance was split into the Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of National Development Planning, the latter of
which eventually integrated the ICCS. The Ministry of
Lands, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection was
split into the Ministry of Water Development, Sanitation and
Environmental Protection (which included the UNFCCC fo-
cal point) and the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources
(where the Department of Climate Change is situated).
Among confused steering committee arrangements, a hastily
assembled task force was tasked with finalisation of the
National Climate Change Policy, which was achieved towards
the end of 2016. The task force process overlooked the
stakeholder-agreed structure and operationalisation of the pol-
icy, however, as had been originally envisaged in the NCCRS.
With the policy approval, the ICCS ceased to exist—but until
now, decisions on next steps have reached an effective stale-
mate, with three ministries all laying claim to the issue
(Zambia government representatives).
Key political factors affecting the emergence
and evolution of the national climate
adaptation agenda in the three countries
Twomain political themes that arose inductively from the data
analysis as important in the emergence and evolution of the
climate adaptation agenda are the role of national leadership
and the role of international donors. Comparing and contrast-
ing the three case studies shows that both factors are impor-
tant, but in different ways, and the interactions between those
factors determine the way in which climate change is
addressed over time and highlight opportunities for broader
learning.
The role of national leadership
In all three countries, the current climate policies and plans
have been developed under preceding governments. The anal-
ysis of policy and repeat interviews over the course of several
years has shown how leadership transition at the highest level
brings changes to policy priorities, which can mean that cli-
mate change either rises up or falls off the agenda. In Malawi,
for example, momentum picked up under Bingu Wa
Mutharika’s leadership and was consolidated under the lead-
ership of Joyce Banda, whose new ministerial structure sig-
nalled the high level commitment to addressing the issue.
Such commitment was then evidenced in the adoption of a
number of policies, strategies and plans relating to climate
change. After his election in 2014, Arthur Peter Mutharika
reduced his cabinet to 18, leading to a restructure in which
the Environmental Affairs Department and Department of
Climate Change and Meteorological Services became part of
the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining. The
next iteration of the Malawi Growth and Development
Strategy 2017–2022 also contains a lesser emphasis on cli-
mate change.
Such a lesser emphasis may explain why fewer than 20%
of survey respondents (surveyed after the election) expected
positive changes from the government in addressing climate
change or expected an emphasis in climate change and why
even fewer (15%) agreed that the new government would
emphasise climate change (Fig. 1). The key role of political
leadership in driving policy agendas was expressed by an
interviewee from a multilateral donor in Malawi, who
highlighted that Arthur Peter Mutharika’s Vice President,
Saulos Chilima, wanted to reverse the trend of economic
growth being linked to disasters and has been a champion
for disaster risk reduction. Another interviewee from a differ-
ent multilateral donor in Malawi highlighted that “there is a
need to mobilise key players in politics to make progress”.
Interview respondents in Tanzania also highlighted the im-
portance of high level political leadership in pushing agendas.
A Tanzanian donor representative commented that “it’s clear-
ly the leadership of the President, if he would speak out on
climate change or tell his government ‘This is a priority. We
have to consider climate change and everything because oth-
erwise we can’t achieve our development targets’, I think
that’s the thing that would make an immediate difference”.
They noted the relative invisibility of climate change for
President John Magufuli, however, citing the fact that he
had not yet mentioned climate change; “we have not yet heard
the President talk about climate change” (Tanzania NGO rep-
resentative) and “I think the top is political leadership from the
very highest level, but I understand the President isn’t ever
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thinking about climate change” (Tanzania donor representa-
tive), making it difficult to determine his stance on the issue.
Instead, since election, the Presidency has prioritised domestic
economic growth through emphasis on industrialisation, as
outlined in various 5-year plans (URT 2011, 2016). At the
same time, the President has limited his own international
travel—thus, whilst representatives are sent to the UNFCCC
Conferences of Parties, the President’s limited engagement in
international policy processes and dialogues has led to very
little effort to address climate change at the national level
(Nachmany 2018; Pardoe et al. 2018b).
Survey results showed that whilst respondents in Tanzania
overwhelmingly agreed (79%) that they expected positive
changes from the change in government, this did not translate
into a positive change in attention towards climate change.
Less than a quarter (24%) of respondents agreed that the re-
cent change in government will emphasise climate change
(Fig. 1). Such a finding was confirmed in several interviews
where respondents suggested that, although climate change is
increasingly recognised as a physical phenomenon, it is not
necessarily seen as a priority issue for the government and key
ministries compared with other pressing issues: “you won’t
see it in the manifestos. It’s kind of an invisible issue [but]
there is recognition that climate change is serious and real”
(Tanzania NGO representative) and that “climate change is
one [issue] but in terms of priority, the government is focus-
sing on development” (Tanzania government agency repre-
sentative). A donor representative commented that “There
have beenmany changes in issues like the past administration,
Kikwete was very much into climate change issues … The
current President hardly talks about climate change.”
Shifts in policy ambitions and priorities are common in
times of change in president, and the survey results highlight
how the combination of changes in leadership and the
influence of leadership priorities on budgets leads to a very
short-term focus in planning. Our longitudinal study has
highlighted how policies developed under one leader may stall
when a new leader arrives, with new ideas and ideologies that
affect the way that climate change is viewed and resourced. In
a pattern that was uniform across the three countries, respondents
highlighted that they focus their planning on a 1–5-year
timeframe, with an average of 76% of survey respondents across
the three countries saying that their planning is frequently focused
on this timeframe, approximately one-fifth planning for 5–
10 years, and very few mentioning longer timeframes (Fig. 2).
This was echoed in interviews with comments in all countries
such as “we plan based on the person’s election. After being
elected, you stay there for five years, everyone is thinking around
the vicinity of five years.Most people don’t want to think beyond
five years for political reasons” (Tanzania government represen-
tative). Changes in political leadership are also typically accom-
panied by cabinet reshuffles, changes in ministry mandates and,
frequently, rotation of high level civil servants that are often
political appointees (Malawi NGO and donor representatives).
Such institutional rearrangements create grey areas around oper-
ational mandates and impede implementation and project man-
agement (Malawi multilateral donor representative).
The implications of this short-term focus have particular
implications for climate change, as climate change adaptation
requires longer term thinking—yet this is incompatible with
political election cycles. Regular changes in leadership can
lead to sudden changes in the emphasis on climate change.
This may sometimes strengthen attention to climate change
(e.g. in the case of Zambia), whereas, on other occasions, it
may herald a shift away from climate change (e.g. Tanzania).
In Malawi, representatives of multilateral and bilateral donors
and government highlighted that people want short-term ben-
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such as agriculture and disaster management are often
prioritised over climate change—with one stating “short-term,
fragmented approaches provide political gains”. In fact, one
government department representative even suggested that a
5-year timeframe is too long for planning, commenting on the
5-year plan that “it is just like a bible, we read it and put it over
there” (i.e. even 5 years is too long considering the timeframe
on which they operate).
These sentiments were reflected in an open-ended question
on the survey, which asked what would make staff more con-
fident in integrating climate information for planning. Survey
responses often highlighted challenges with unreliable
budget allocations and disbursements associated with changing
political priorities: In Malawi, many interviewees spoke of the
inertia and incrementalism in government and the “resistance to
change” among bureaucrats (bilateral donor representative). In
alignment with this, a multilateral donor stated that “when gov-
ernment fails to lead, donors often step in—yet government will
frequently not integrate their efforts”.
The role of donors
Donor funding and the role of external actors have played a
range of (generally) proactive roles in the evolution of the
climate change agenda in each country. Despite increasing
numbers of initiatives to track adaptation finance and the use
of climate markers in aid flows, robust information on the
receipt of donor funding to specific developing countries is
scarce (Donner et al. 2011; Buchner et al. 2011). A 2012
analysis found that Norway, the FAO, the World Bank,
USAID and the European Union were among the major con-
tributors to adaptation activities in Malawi (CCAPS 2013). In
all three countries, donor support played a key role in the
emergence of the climate change agenda and supported the
development of policies and strategies. Malawi and Tanzania
were part of the JICA-funded Africa Adaptation Programme,
for example, which ran from 2008 to 2012; and in Zambia,
climate change emerged as a domestic political issue in 2009
when UNDP, with the support of the Government of Norway,
established the CCFU in the Ministry of Tourism,
Environment and Natural Resources.
In Zambia, the receipt of substantial donor funding for cli-
mate change has created incentives for bargaining and contes-
tation around control of the climate change agenda at ministe-
rial level. Zambia was selected to receive funds from the PPCR,
under the Climate Investment Funds, in 2011. Numerous inter-
viewees inside and outside the government commented on the
serendipitous timing of this, coinciding with the finalisation of
the National Climate Change Response Strategy that mandated
creation of a National Climate Change Council. Structural ar-
rangements to accommodate this were discussed by sectors
considered vulnerable to climate change by the NAPA and
the NCCRS. The institutional issue around which ministry
would hold the climate change portfolio was, however, de-
scribed as a “hot potato” by both a multilateral donor and a
government staff member. The imminent arrival of the PPCR,
which required a secretariat to oversee its activities, as men-
tioned earlier, catalysed the decision to form an Interim
Climate Change Secretariat (ICCS).
In effect, the formation of the ICCS in Zambia postponed a
final decision on the permanent institutional setup to address
climate change. However, continued receipt of international
climate finance (PPCR alone contributed $91 million to the
country as of 2019)—and the promise of additional funds
through mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund—
essentially provided a powerful incentive for ongoing interest
in the climate change agenda. At the same time, the backdrop
of regular cabinet reshuffles that have accompanied a period
of unusually rapid presidential change in Zambia further com-
plicated the decision on a long-term institutional home. Three
ministries currently all lay claim to the climate change agenda,
and a final institutional home is yet to be confirmed. However,
the task force process overlooked the stakeholder-agreed
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originally envisaged in the NCCRS.With the policy approval,
the ICCS ceased to exist, but as yet, decisions on next steps
have reached an effective stalemate with three ministries, as
outlined in the section “Zambia”, all laying claim to the issue.
With such institutional complexity and overlapping processes
and lack of clarity with regard to mandate, it is not surprising
that over 35% of survey respondents in Zambia said that pol-
icy is rarely implemented—the second highest after Tanzania
(Fig. 1).
Whilst the availability of resources has not caused the
levels of contestation and bargaining around climate change
evident in Zambia, in Malawi and in Tanzania, smaller scale
donor-supported projects and funding opportunities can
facilitate/enable projects where domestic budget allocations
are otherwise limited. In terms of power, ideas and ideologies,
as seen in the case of Zambia, the availability of funding
opportunities may lead to turf wars between ministries and
departments.
Implementation of policy is also adversely affected by the
high levels of uncertainty that stem from reliance on donor
funding rather than predictable, on-budget resource allocation.
Reliance on donors, as mentioned earlier, can also create com-
petition between ministries, as they bargain for resources with
which to work. In Malawi, representatives of several minis-
tries bemoaned the fact that one department was acting as an
implementer for several donor-funded climate adaptation
programmes, despite having only a coordination mandate.
Competition for resources has another effect that further im-
pedes policy implementation—it creates barriers to coordina-
tion and impedes the coherent cross-sectoral approaches that
are necessary to effectively adapt to climate change (England
et al. 2018b). One NGO representative in Malawi highlighted
how coordination is impeded “because everyone wants their
names on things”, whilst a former government and bilateral
donor representative stated that “the problem with climate
change is there are a good number of players and organisers
that mean well-but coordination is a problem”. A Malawi
government representative further explained how they could
not merge two coordination fora, as they would have liked,
due to donor reporting requirements. However, as the
section “Tanzania” shows, the President currently promotes
a focus on self-reliance and has moved away from courting
donor support and promoting issues of wider international
concern, including climate change: “So now we have a much
more inward-looking, nationalistic type of presidency. The
previous one was much more outward-looking…the adminis-
tration’s changed.” (Tanzania NGO representative).
Although there were some examples of policy champions
within the government, the often rapid rotation of permanent
secretaries and directors can impede their ability to drive prog-
ress. A government representative in Malawi explained how
these factors combine to create reluctance to plan into the
future, due to the uncertainty of resources being available
due to dependence on donors. He noted that his department’s
main plan “has a list of infrastructure schemes to develop and
a budget of anticipated costs…so development partners will
then shop from the list”. A government ministry representa-
tive in Tanzania highlighted that “climate change for us is not
a priority since we have other issues.” However, “they [do-
nors] are trying to have an influence on us [through] funds…
to develop proposals on different basins we are working on so
that we can deal with climate change”. Another multilateral
donor in Malawi observed that a certain government depart-
ment “dances to the tune of [another donor]”. The conse-
quence for government technocrats of being reliant on uncer-
tain donor funding is that it may undermine a sense of staff
autonomy and agency to act, as the funding is linked primarily
to the goals of the funder, rather than the government agencies
(Pardoe et al. 2018a). In addition, in Zambia, a government
representative highlighted the burdens placed on scarce hu-
man resources for meeting the varying reporting requirements
of different donors who funded different projects being imple-
mented. This raises questions as to whether donors are
influencing and/or subverting national interests, providing
funds for activities that support donor demands (themselves
often linked to the political leadership in their own countries)
rather than supporting national policies.
Discussion and conclusion
In this study, we applied purposive sampling of government
and non-government stakeholders in the climate policy arena
and complementary data from a survey and interviews and
document analysis to conduct a longitudinal analysis of the
political influences on the evolution of the national climate
adaptation agenda in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. Based
on these data sources, our findings highlight two main factors
that are common across all three countries but show that the
ways in which they have operated and interacted in each coun-
try have led to three different trajectories of policy evolution.
These two political factors are the roles of national leadership
and donors. Together, the intersection of national leadership
and donors over time is associated with the priority placed on,
and resources dedicated to, climate change, through policies
and programmes and the institutional framework through
which they are managed. As we have shown, this varies in
each country. In Malawi, the evolution of the national climate
change agenda, as manifest in policies, programmes and insti-
tutions, is very closely linked to power exercised through po-
litical leadership. In Zambia, the high flux in the ministerial
environment for climate change reflects the turf wars and bat-
tles which are less directly and immediately connected to
changes in power compared with Malawi—yet they do show
a high degree of change in responsibilities. In Tanzania, the
relative stagnation in the climate change policy landscape
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since around 2015 reflects a lessening of political interest in
climate change as an international issue rather than one of high
domestic relevance. Given our methods, these insights are
associative not causal, and we caution against transferability
of findings beyond the three cases—similar methods would
have to be applied in other countries to allow comparative
analysis.
Identification of the importance of donors in shaping na-
tional climate change agendas has implications for aid effective-
ness and development goals. Broader scholarship on political
processes in aid effectiveness notes the general diplomatic as-
sumption that recipient countries have leaders for whom national
development is a central objective (Booth 2012). However,
Booth argues that in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, ‘the
modal pattern is that public policies are largely driven by short-
run political considerations, and these usually dictate a
clientelistic mode of political legitimation, not one based on de-
livery of the public goods required for economic and social trans-
formation’ (Booth 2012: 540). Some aspects of our findings echo
these concerns, and they are highly relevant for climate change as
a popular policy agenda and increasing source of finance being
channelled through overseas development aid mechanisms, as is
increasingly the case. Calls for opening up rather than closing
down opportunities for contestation (Eriksen et al. 2015) and a
more transformative agenda for adaptation (Kates et al. 2012;
Pelling et al. 2015) recognise the importance of power structures
and need for political analysis. However, these aims are
constrained by the nature of the aid bureaucracy delivery system
itself, which has shown limited progress towards integrating po-
litical analysis into its practice (Yanguas and Hulme 2015).
Measures to address such concerns mesh well between those
identified by adaptation and broader development scholars. In
terms of political leadership, Booth (2012) stresses the need for
political incentives to align such that leaders are motivated by
longer term national development goals. This requires political
economy analysis that reveals power structures working against
positive change based on deep understanding of actors and inter-
ests at play (Barnett 2008; Tanner and Allouche 2011; Booth
2012; Eriksen et al. 2015).
What this research has shown, contributing to the gap
highlighted by Tanner and Allouche (2011), is that donors
can (but do not always) significantly influence power and
ideologies by providing resources in terms of financial but
also technical support. In this way, resources can (and fre-
quently do) incentivise attention to climate change—but this
takes place through different mechanisms, depending on the
stance of the leadership/president on the importance of climate
change in the national agenda.
Whilst power brings resources, however, resources may
also bring power, and the influence of donors is not always
benevolent. This is particularly the case in developing coun-
tries, where scarce national resources often result in a de facto
surrender of power to those that provide the financial
resources. As demonstrated in Zambia, external resources
may promulgate turf wars and battles to secure responsibility
for the climate change agenda in order to secure access to a
funding stream. In Malawi, whilst it has not manifested in the
institutional and governance arrangements to the same extent,
intense competition for scarce resources has similarly created
obstacles to the cooperation and coherence required to address
a cross-sectoral issue such as climate change adaptation. Even
in Tanzania, where donor influence is diminishing, it still in-
fluences departments and diverts resources. Over the course of
time and particularly with changes in leadership and resulting
restructuring of ministries, this has resulted in waxing and
waning commitments to the climate change agenda, accom-
panied by complex and often contested arrangements, where
responsibilities are split over different departments—resulting
in confusion around mandates and ultimately hampering ef-
fectiveness in planning and implementation.
This study shows convergence of power and resources—
not only from the perspectives of donors, who resemble re-
source holders and so bring power, but also from the political
leadership. The presidents are primarily the source of power in
all three countries, but they also determine the extent to which,
and way in which, donor resources are “allowed” to enter the
landscape. In Tanzania, for example, a more hostile environ-
ment is developing that restricts the influence of donor
funding—whereas in Zambia, sanctioned and sought after
funds themselves have led to contested territory. The interac-
tion between power and resources (and the power embedded
within the resources) creates a different—and arguably more
complex—political economy landscape for climate adaptation
in sub-Saharan Africa, relative to the global North. As such,
unravelling the roles and interaction between such influences
is challenging and dependent on the manner in which external
donors are allowed entry (or not) to the national political
landscape.
In this paper, we have focused on national level adaptation
planning—but the politics at this level have broader implica-
tions. An understanding of political economy and power could
identify the areas where power and resources converge and
where they do not, allowing targeting of those currently losing
out on support for adaptation (e.g. Barrett 2014; Persson and
Remling 2014; Remling and Persson 2015). The framing and
construction of societal issues such as climate change reflects
particular ontologies which are embedded in power relations
(Goldman et al. 2018). Since the aim of national level adap-
tation planning is for subnational level implementation, the
way in which adaptation is constructed and embodied, and
the power relations that it reflects, can have distributional ef-
fects on who benefits and who loses from this construction
(Nightingale et al. 2019). Thus, developing socially just and
inclusive national adaptation planning—as a prerequisite for
implementation—also requires a critical approach to under-
standing these configurations of power and politics.
Reg Environ Change          (2020) 20:118 Page 13 of 16   118 
Acknowledgements We are grateful to Emilinah Namaganda, Ruth
Emmanuel, Japhet Kashaigili, Diana Mataya and Michal Nachmany for
support with fieldwork and data collection.
Funding This work was carried out under the Future Climate For Africa
UMFULA project, with financial support from the UK Natural
Environment Research Council (NERC), grant references: NE/
M020398/1 (LSE), NE/M020010/1 (Kulima), NE/M02007X/1 (CSIR),
NE/M020177/1 (University of Leeds) and NE/M020509/1 (LUANAR),
and the UK Government’s Department for International Development
(DFID); and with financial support from the UK Economic and Social
Research Council (ESRC) through the Centre for Climate Change
Economics and Policy, grant numbers ES/R002371/1 (LSE) and ES/
K006576/1 (Leeds). Further insights draw on work carried out under
the British Academy project ‘The governance and implementation of
the SDG13 on Climate Change’.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adap-
tation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, pro-
vide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were
made. The images or other third party material in this article are included
in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a
credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's
Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain
permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this
licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
References
Ayers JM, Huq S (2009) Supporting adaptation to climate change: what
role for official development assistance? Development Policy
Review 27(6):675–692. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2009.
00465.x
Barnett J (2008) The effect of aid on capacity to adapt to climate change:
insights from Niue. Political Science 60(1):31–45. https://doi.org/
10.1177/003231870806000104
Barrett S (2014) Subnational climate justice? Adaptation finance distri-
bution and climate vulnerability. World Development 58:130–142.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.01.014
Biagini B, Bierbaum R, Stults M, Dobardzic S, McNeeley SM (2014) A
typology of adaptation actions: a global look at climate adaptation
actions financed through the Global Environment Facility. Glob
Environ Chang 25:97–108. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.
2014.01.003
Biesbroek GR, Klostermann JEM, Termeer CJAM, Kabat P (2013) On
the nature of barriers to climate change adaptation. Reg Environ
Chang 13:1119–1129. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-013-0421-y
Booth D (2012) Aid effectiveness: bringing country ownership (and pol-
itics) back in, conflict, security & development, 12(5), 537–558,
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2012.744184
Bouwer JM, Aerts JCJH (2006) Financing climate change adaptation.
Disasters 30(1):49–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9523.2006.
00306.x
Boykoff MT, Yulsman T (2013) Political economy, media, and climate
change: sinews of modern life. WIREs Climate Change 4(5):359–
371. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.233
Buchner B, Brown J, Corfee-Morlot J (2011) Monitoring and tracking
long-term finance to support climate action, OECD Publishing,
Paris, paper no. 2011(3)
CCAPS (2013) Tracking climate aid in Africa: the case of Malawi, cli-
mate change and African political security research brief 18, Robert
S. Strauss Center for International Security and law, University of
Texas at Austin
Clark GC, Andersson K, Ostrom E, Shivakumar S (2005) The
Samaritan’s dilemma: the political economy of development aid.
Oxford University Press, Oxford
Collier D (2011) Understanding process tracing. PS: Political Science &
Po l i t i c s 4 4 ( 4 ) : 8 2 3 –830 . h t t p s : / / d o i . o r g / 1 0 . 1 01 7 /
S1049096511001429
Conway D, Mittal N, Archer van Garderen E, Pardoe J, ToddM, Vincent
K, Washington R (2017) Future climate projections for Tanzania.
Future climate for Africa country climate brief, 12p. http://www.
futureclimateafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/fcfa_tanzania_
climatebrief_web.pdf
Davis-Reddy CL, Vincent K (2017) Climate risk and vulnerability: a
handbook for southern Africa (2nd edition). CSIR, Pretoria, 202.
https://www.csir.co.za/documents/sadc-handbooksecond-
editionfull-reportpdf
Dodman D, Mitlin D (2015) The national and local politics of climate
change adaptation in Zimbabwe. Clim Dev 7(3):223–234. https://
doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2014.934777
Donner SD, Kandlikar M, Zerriffi H (2011) Preparing to manage climate
change financing. Science 334:908–909. https://doi.org/10.1126/
science.1211886
Dupuis J, Knoepfel P (2013) The adaptation policy paradox: the imple-
mentation deficit of policies framed as climate change adaptation.
Ecol Soc 18(4):31. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-05965-180431
Eisenack K, Moser SC, Hoffmann E, Klein RJT, Oberlack C et al. (2014)
Explaining and overcoming barriers to climate change adaptation.
Nat Clim Chang 4:867–872. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2350
EnglandMI, Stringer LC, Dougill AJ, Afionis S (2018a) How do sectoral
policies support climate compatible development? An empirical
analysis focusing on southern Africa. Environmental Science and
Policy 79:9–15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.10.009
EnglandMI, Dougill AJ, Stringer LC, Vincent KE, Pardoe J et al. (2018b)
Climate change adaptation and cross-sectoral policy coherence in
southern Africa. Reg Environ Chang 18(7):2059–2071. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10113-018-1283-0
Eriksen SH, Nightingale AJ, Eakin H (2015) Reframing adaptation: the
political nature of climate change adaptation. Glob Environ Chang
35:523–533. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.09.014
Funder M, Mweemba CE (2019) Interface bureaucrats and the everyday
remaking of climate interventions: evidence from climate change
adaptation in Zambia. Glob Environ Chang 55:130–138. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.02.007
Funder M,Mweemba C, Nyambe I (2018) The politics of climate change
adaptation in development: authority, resource control and state in-
tervention in rural Zambia. J Dev Stud 54(1):30–46. https://doi.org/
10.1080/00220388.2016.1277021
Gisselquist RM (2014) Paired comparison and theory development: con-
siderations for case selection. PS: Political Science & Politics 47(2):
477–484. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096514000419
Goldman MJ, Turner M, Daly M (2018) A critical political ecology of
human dimensions of climate change: epistemology, ontology, and
ethics.Wiley Interdiscip Rev Clim Chang 9(4):e526. https://doi.org/
10.1002/wcc.526
Gotham KF (2016) Coastal Restoration as Contested Terrain: Climate
Change and the Political Economy of Risk Reduction in
Louisiana. Sociological Forum 31:787–806. https://doi.org/10.
1111/socf.12273
Government ofMalawi (2006)Malawi’s national adaptation programmes
of action (NAPA) under the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Government of Malawi, Lilongwe
  118 Page 14 of 16 Reg Environ Change          (2020) 20:118 
Government of Malawi (2011a) Sector policies response to climate
change in Malawi: a comprehensive gap analysis. Government of
Malawi, Lilongwe
Government of Malawi (2011b). Training needs assessment for climate
change management structures inMalawi. National Climate Change
Programme Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. http://
www.nccpmw.org/
Government of Malawi (2011c) Malawi growth and development strate-
gy II, 2011–16. Ministry of Finance and Development Planning,
Lilongwe
Government of Malawi (2012) National Environment and Climate
Change Communication Strategy 2012-16, Ministry of
Environment and Climate Change. Management, Lilongwe
Government ofMalawi (2013) National Climate Change Investment Plan
2013–18, Ministry of Environment and Climate Change.
Management, Lilongwe
Government of Malawi (2016) National Climate Change Management
Policy. Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining,
Lilongwe
Government of Malawi (2017) Malawi Growth and Development
Strategy III, 2017-22. Government of Malawi, Lilongwe
Habtezion S, Adelekan I, Aiyede E, Biermann F, Fubara M et al. (2015)
Earth system governance in Africa: knowledge and capacity needs.
Curr Opin Environ Sustain 14:198–205. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
cosust.2015.06.009
Kates RW, Travis WR, Wilbanks TJ (2012) Transformational adaptation
when incremental adaptations to climate change are insufficient.
Proc Natl Acad Sci 109(19):7156–7161. https://doi.org/10.1073/
pnas.1115521109
Kinley R (2017) Climate change after Paris: from turning point to trans-
formation. Clim Pol 17(1):9–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.
2016.1191009
Klein RJT, Eriksen SEH, Næss LO, Hammill A, Tanner TM et al. (2007)
Portfolio screening to support the mainstreaming of adaptation to
climate change into development assistance. Clim Chang 84(1):23–
44. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-007-9268-x
Levy DL, Spicer A (2013) Contested imaginaries and the cultural polit-
ical economy of climate change. Organization 20(5):659–678.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508413489816
Lockwood M (2013) What can climate-adaptation policy in sub-Saharan
Africa learn from research on governance and politics?
Development Policy Review 31(6):647–676. https://doi.org/10.
1111/dpr.12029
MAFC (2014) Tanzania Agriculture Climate Resilience Plan 2014–2019,
Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives
Mallin M-AF (2018) From sea-level rise to seabed grabbing: the political
economy of climate change in Kiribati. Mar Policy 97:244–252.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2018.04.021
Maro PS (2008) A review of current. Tanzanian national environmental
policy Geographical Journal 174(2):149–175. https://www.jstor.
org/stable/40205211
Mikulewicz M (2020) The discursive politics of adaptation to climate
change. Annals of the American Association of Geographers.
https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2020.1736981
Mittal N, Vincent K, Conway D, Archer van Garderen E, Pardoe J et al.
(2017) Future climate projections for Malawi. Future Climate For
Africa Country Climate Brief, 12. http://www.futureclimateafrica.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/2772_malawi_climatebrief_v6.
pdf
NachmanyM (2018) Climate change governance in Tanzania: challenges
and opportunities. Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change
and the Environment and Centre for Climate Change Economics
and Policy Policy brief, 8. http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/
wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Climate-change-governance-in-
Tanzania-challenges-and-opportunities.pdf
Nachmany, M., Fankhauser, S., Setzer, J., Averchenkova, A. (2017)
Global trends in climate change legislation and litigation, 2017 up-




Næss LO, Polack E, Chinsinga B (2011) Bridging research and policy
processes for climate change adaptation. Institute of Development
Studies Bulletin 42(3):97–103. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.
2011.00227.x
Næss LO, Newell P, Newsham A, Phillips J, Quan J (2015) Climate
policy meets national development contexts: insights from Kenya
andMozambique. Glob Environ Chang 35:534–544. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.08.015
Nightingale A (2017) Power and politics in climate change adaptation
efforts: struggles over authority and recognition in the context of
political instability. Geoforum 84:11–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
geoforum.2017.05.011
Nightingale AJ, Eriksen S, Taylor M, Forsyth T, Pelling M et al. (2019)
Beyond technical fixes: climate solutions and the great derange-
ment. Clim Dev. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2019.1624495
Pardoe J, Vincent K, Conway D (2018a) How do staff motivation and
workplace environment affect capacities to adapt to climate change
in developing countries? Environ Sci Policy 90:46–53. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.envsci.2018.09.020
Pardoe J, ConwayD, Namaganda E, Vincent K, Dougill AJ et al. (2018b)
Climate change and the water-energy-food nexus: insights from pol-
icy and practice in Tanzania. Clim Pol 18(7):863–877. https://doi.
org/10.1080/14693062.2017.1386082
Patton MQ (1980) Qualitative evaluation methods. Sage, Beverly Hills
Paterson M, P-Laberge X (2018) Political economies of climate change.
WIREs Climate Change 9:e506. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.506
Pelling M, O'Brien K, & Matyas D (2015) Adaptation and transforma-
tion. Climatic Change 133(1):113–127. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10584-014-1303-0
PerssonÅ, Remling E (2014) Equity and efficiency in adaptation finance:
initial experiences of the adaptation fund. Clim Pol. https://doi.org/
10.1080/14693062.2013.879514
Remling E, Persson Å (2015) Who is adaptation for? Vulnerability and
adaptation benefits in proposals approved by the UNFCCC
Adaptation Fund. Clim Dev 7(1):16–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/
17565529.2014.886992
Republic of Zambia (2007) Formulation of the National Adaptation
Programme of Action. Ministry of Tourism, Environment and
Natural Resources, Lusaka
Republic of Zambia (2011a) National Climate Change Communication
and Advocacy Strategy. Ministry of Tourism, Environment and
Natural Resources, Lusaka
Republic of Zambia (2011b) National Climate Change Response
Strategy. Ministry of Local Government, Housing, Early
Education and Environmental Protection, Lusaka
Ricks JI, Liu AH (2018) Process-tracing research designs: a practical
guide. PS: Political Science & Politics 51(4):842–846. https://doi.
org/10.1017/S1049096518000975
Smucker TA, Wisner B, Mascarenhas A, Munishi P, Wangui EE et al.
(2015) Differentiated livelihoods, local institutions, and the adapta-
tion imperative: assessing climate change adaptation policy in
Tanzania. Geoforum 59:39–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.
2014.11.018
Sovacool BK, Linnér B-O (2015) The political economy of climate
change adaptation. Palgrave MacMillan, New York
Sovacool BK, Linnér B, Goodsite ME (2015) The political economy of
climate adaptation. Nat Clim ChangNature Climate Change 5:616–
618
Sovacool BK, Tan-Mullins M, Ockwell D, Newell P (2017) Political
economy, poverty, and polycentrism in the global environment
Reg Environ Change          (2020) 20:118 Page 15 of 16   118 
facility’s least developed countries fund (LDCF) for climate change
adaptation. Third World Q 38(6):1249–1271. https://doi.org/10.
1080/01436597.2017.1282816
Tanner T, Allouche J (2011) Towards a new political economy of climate
change and development. Institute of Development Studies Bulletin
42(3):1–14. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2011.00217.x
Tschakert P, Das PJ, Pradhan NS, Machado M, Lamadrid A et al. (2016)
Micropolitics in collective learning spaces for adaptive decision
making. Glob Environ Chang 40:182–194. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.gloenvcha.2016.07.004
Uittenbroek CJ (2016) From policy document to implementation: orga-
nizational routines as possible barriers to mainstreaming climate
adaptation. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 18(2):
161–176. https://doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2015.1065717
URT (2007) National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA). Vice
President’s Office, Division of Environment, Dar es Salaam
URT (2011). National five year development plan 2011/2012–2015/
2016. President’s office, Planning Commission, Dar es Salaam
URT (2012a) National Climate Change Strategy. United Republic of
Tanzania Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment,
Dar es Salaam
URT (2012b) National Climate Change Communication Strategy (2012–
2017) United Republic of Tanzania Vice President’s Office,
Division of Environment, Dar es Salaam
URT (2012c) Guidelines for integrating climate change adaptation into
National Sectoral Policies, Plans and Programmes of Tanzania.
United Republic of Tanzania Vice President’s Office, Division of
Environment, Dar es Salaam
URT (2016) National five year development plan 2016/17–2020/2021.
Ministry of Finance and Planning, Dar es Salaam
URT (2018) The project on the revision of National Irrigation Master
Plan. Final Report, vol 1. National Irrigation Commission,
Ministry of Water and Irrigation, The United Republic of Tanzania
Vincent K, Dougill AJ, Dixon JL, Stringer LC, Cull T (2015) Identifying
climate services needs for national planning: insights from Malawi.
Clim Pol 17(2):189–202. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2015.
1075374
Yanguas P, Hulme D (2015) Barriers to political analysis in aid bureau-
cracies: from principle to practice in DFID and the World Bank.
World Dev 74:209–219. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.
05.009
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdic-
tional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
  118 Page 16 of 16 Reg Environ Change          (2020) 20:118 
